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Abstract.  In response to the economic, natural, and political crisis that enveloped 
Indonesia from August 1997 (beginning of depreciation) to May 1998 (resignation of 
Soeharto), the new government announced support for a set of “safety net” (JPS) 
programs in July 1998 budget.  These included: (a) targeted sales of subsidized rice, (b) 
work creation programs, (c) scholarships to students and block grants to schools, (d) 
targeted health care subsidies, (e) community block grants. We used cross sectional and 
panel data to examine the targeting of these programs.  First, “static participation 
incidence” (the relationship between program participation and household consumption 
expenditures) was substantially better than a uniform transfer, but substantially worse 
than perfect targeting --and remarkably similar for all of the JPS programs.  Second, 
unlike standard static incidence measures, what we define as dynamic participation 
incidence — the relationship between changes in consumption expenditures and program 
participation — was very different between the JPS programs.  The employment creation 
programs which relied on self-selection targeting was much more likely to reach those 
households with large shocks to their expenditures than programs based on administrative 
targeting such as subsidized rice sales, scholarships, and health subsidies.  Third, larger 
coverage does not lead to either better or worse targeting:  there is no general tendency 
across the programs for marginal incidence to be above, or below, average incidence.  
Fourth, the targeting design of many of the programs was not followed strictly in 
implementation in all of the programs. Community and individual characteristics that 
were de jure irrelevant played a role in targeting in practice. In the rice program, 
community influence led to the program going to many more than the eligible 
individuals.  In other programs, individual characteristics appear to have influenced 
targeting.  
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 1
 Introduction 
 
Whether as the result of financial/currency crisis (Thailand, Korea, Indonesia 
1997; Russia, Ecuador 1998; Brazil 1999; Turkey 2001; Argentina 2002), delayed 
systemic transformation (the countries of the FSU), or domestic difficulties (Zimbabwe 
2001), a large number of countries have experienced macroeconomic crises.  The 
precipitous falls in macroeconomic aggregates are reflected in negative impacts on 
individuals—both as households’ incomes fall and poverty rises and as public spending 
falls reducing available services for the poor (see Ravallion 2002a on fiscal incidence of 
contractions).  An increasingly frequent response to macroeconomic crisis is an attempt 
to mitigate the worst consequences of these shocks through crisis “safety net” programs 
(Ferreira, Prennushi, and Ravallion, 1999).  Indonesia was no different and launched a 
series of crisis programs in response to the crisis, known as the JPS (Jaring Pengaman 
Sosial) programs.   
This paper draws on several recent household data sets to present four empirical 
findings about the targeting of these crisis programs1.  Within the huge literatures on 
each of the many aspects of the targeting and benefit incidence of government programs,2 
this paper has three unique features.  First, we address the question of the targeting of 
crisis programs that were created deliberately to address the consequences of a specific 
                                                 
1 With our focus in the paper on targeting, we do not address other important aspects of program design and 
evaluation.  Design issues such as the match of administrative capacity to program complexity, aligning 
implementing agency interests to program design, the ease of information dissemination (issues in which 
economists have no special comparative advantage) are crucial to the success of crisis programs, but these 
have been addressed elsewhere (World Bank, 2001).  Assessing program impact on household outcomes 
(consumption, health, drop-out) depends on the usual difficult issues of identifying the counter-factual (no 
program) outcome, which requires a separate treatment that both we (Suryahadi et al., 2002) and others 
(Cameron, 2002 for education; Saadah, Pradhan, and Sparrow, 2001 for health) have addressed elsewhere. 
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 economic shock.  Second, we are able to use multiple data sources, including a panel data 
set spanning the crisis, to cross validate findings.  Third, we are able to make 
comparisons across the set of programs.  
After a brief background on the crisis we describe the targeting design of five 
major programs: subsidized rice, student scholarships, health care subsidies, employment 
creation, and community block grants. The following sections examine the four empirical 
findings.    
I)  The Design and Targeting of the Indonesia Crisis JPS Programs 
I.A)  Crisis, impact, and the launch of the JPS 
After nearly thirty years of uninterrupted rapid growth, low inflation, and a stable 
currency, in August of 1997 Indonesia’s currency began to slide in what at first appeared 
to be only the spillover from Thailand’s crisis.  But by May 1998 the country was 
suffering from the combined effects of a currency, financial, natural, economic, and 
political crisis.  The currency collapsed in waves, from its pre-crisis level of 2,200 rupiah 
in mid 1997 to the dollar to 5,000 by October, to 6,000 by December, to a free fall in 
January 1998 (following the almost immediate collapse of the second ill-fated IMF 
program) which took the currency as low as 17,000 rupiah per dollar.  The effect of the 
currency devaluation on the substantial unhedged foreign currency denominated 
borrowing by both the domestic financial and corporate sectors (on top of underlying 
structural weaknesses of the sector) created a financial crisis.  The fear of widespread 
banking collapse caused the Central Bank to issue a blanket guarantee of inter-bank loans 
                                                 
2 Grosh (1994) on administrative aspects,  van de Walle and Nead (1995) is a good overview volume on the 
issue of targeting.  The output of the cottage industry calculating benefit incidence and targeting is well 
reviewed  in Coady, Grosh, and Hoddinott (2002).      
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 in January 1998 which in turn allowed the money supply to nearly triple between early 
1998 and late 1999 (Deuster 2002).  In addition nature was unkind as fires burned out of 
control in large sections of Sumatra in the fall of 1997 and a drought reduced the primary 
rice crop.  
The combination of these impacts caused an economic contraction of near 
unprecedented magnitude—GDP per capita fell 13.7 percent in 1998 and inflation 
skyrocketed. The money supply expansion and currency depreciation caused 
skyrocketing domestic prices particularly for food (since food is a tradable it was more 
affected by the depreciation--the general inflation rate was 78 percent in 1998 while food 
prices escalated by 118 percent).  All of this, combined with signs of weakness and ill 
health from Soeharto, led to a political crisis.  Student deaths and rioting in the capital 
Jakarta and several other cities led to the May 1998 resignation of the Soeharto, who had 
been in power since the mid 1960s.3  
The social impact of the crisis was immediate, substantial and is still evolving 
today.  Real wages of formal sector workers fell by around one third between August 
1997 and August 1998 before beginning some recovery in 1999 as nominal wages began 
to grow (Feridhanusetyawan, 1999;  Manning, 2000; Papanek and Handoko, 1999).4   
One large scale household survey, the “100 Villages Survey” study (see detail below) 
                                                 
3 The story of the Indonesian economic crisis and its possible proximate and deep causes has been told 
many times in academic (McLeod, 1998), official (World Bank, 1999), and journalistic (Blustein, 2001) 
accounts.  
4 Given the flexible labor market dominated by informal and self-employment officially measured open 
unemployment was never really the issue; it rose only from 4.7 in August 1997, to 5.5 in 1998, and to 6.4 
in 1999.   
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 showed real consumption expenditures falling 17 percent from May 1997 to August 
1998.5  
Our attempt to piece together a consistent series on the headcount measure of 
absolute consumption expenditure (ACE) poverty from all the various sources suggests 
ACE poverty increased by 164 percent from the onset of the crisis in mid 1997 to its peak 
at the end of 1998 (Suryahadi et al., 2000).6    
Figure 1:  The Evolution of the Headcount Poverty Rate in Indonesia,  
February 1996 to November 1999 (Sept. 1997=100) 
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5 The reconciliation of the national accounts fall in “real” PCE and the household survey based measures is 
due to the enormous shift in relative prices which implies that deflators which used a small share for food 
such as the CPI and the GDP deflator showed small “real” falls while those using food shares for the poorer 
households showed much larger “real” falls.   
6 In July 1998 there was considerable debate as estimates of the crisis increase in ACE headcount poverty 
rates ranged from as high as 30 to as low as 3 percentage points.  These attempts at “real time” estimates 
suffered from a variety of methodological problems. 
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 In the face of the economic and political instability and the enormous (and 
growing) social consequences there were both pragmatic and benign motivations of the 
programs.  First, both the new government and the international financial institutions and 
bilateral agencies needed to be seen to be responding pro-actively to the impacts of the 
crisis in order to sharply differentiate themselves from the past.  Second, there was a 
desire to mitigate the impacts of the shock on both households and communities.  Third, 
many were interested in protecting certain key social services—notably health and 
education.  Fourth, there were Keynesian motivations to sustain aggregate demand both 
nationally and locally to halt the collapse in output.  Finally, there were some who 
wanted to use the crisis and the new program to reorient government attention to poverty.  
The outcome of the mix of those motivations and the constraints on design imposed by 
availability of data produced a set of programs with differing targeting design. 
The resignation of Soeharto in May 1998 created three inter-related difficulties: 
the budget approved for the fiscal year running from April 1998 to March 1999 was no 
longer operative, there needed to be a new IMF program approved (which required a new 
budget), and the IMF program required the arrangement of external financing of the 
government deficit.  In July 1998 such a budget was produced, which contained, within 
the new FY 1998/99 budget a line item for “safety net” or JPS (Jaring Pengaman Sosial) 
programs7.  The magnitude of the budget for the JPS programs was not the result of 
costing out programs or based on any historical baseline but was an amount determined 
by macroeconomic, political, and financing forces with which programs could be 
                                                 
7 We will refer to the programs by the Indonesian acronym JPS because this is more neutral than the term 
“safety net”—and as we dislike the “safety net” metaphor and this will save us the constant use of scare 
quotes.  
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 designed.  This meant that programs needed to be designed.   However, the Indonesian 
people have never relied to any significant extent on government safety net programs as 
prior to the crisis the country had neither the economic apparatus nor the political 
mechanisms (nor the inclination) required to deliver large scale transfer programs all over 
the archipelago8.  Establishing crisis programs in Indonesia in 1998 meant not merely 
expanding an existing net but casting an entirely new one. 
I.B) Targeting the JPS programs:  Data Availability 
Program targeting design needs to give a complete specification of how resources 
will flow from the public sector budget to the program participants.  There are two basic 
dimensions of program targeting—the geographic scope and allocation of the budget to 
the relevant implementing jurisdictions of the government and the mechanisms for the 
choice of specific households/individuals which will participate. 
Amongst developing countries, Indonesia is a numbers rich environment.  It has 
an annual household survey (the SUSENAS), Survey of Manufacturing, Population 
Census, Agricultural Census, Economic Census, Village Census (the PODES), and so on, 
it has also a functioning administrative apparatus that reaches into every village/urban 
neighborhood in the country.  However, while in this numbers rich environment there 
was relatively recent information about the levels of various regional and household 
indicators of well-being, there was no timely, complete, and administratively acceptable 
                                                 
 
8 The general poverty strategy of the previous government was (a) social spending, largely focused on the 
provision of ‘social services’ such as health, family planning, and education, (b) “development” programs 
that aimed at poverty reduction through increasing productivity (such as credit subsidies, left-behind 
villages program (IDT), etc), (c) some small programs for very limited disadvantaged groups (e.g. disabled, 
orphans) and (d) family and communities providing ‘mutual social insurance’ in times of difficulty  (there 
was some subsidized health care, compulsory social security program, and unemployment protection  for 
formal sector employees but this was of very limited reach). Since before the crisis, Indonesia was one of 
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 data on the impact of the shock that would have allowed either accurate allocation of the 
JPS either to regions or individuals.  
Regional allocations. At the time the JPS programs were being designed it was 
increasingly clear that the regional impact of the crisis was heterogeneous — and that 
there was little connection between the regional distribution of the impact of the shock 
and the regional distribution of pre-shock poverty9.  In particular, urban areas on the 
island of Java — which were among the wealthiest areas of the crisis — were the 
epicenter of the financial and modern sector crisis.  In contrast, traditionally poorer 
natural resource exporting areas actually benefited from the crisis10.  As the crisis 
affected food prices the impact onto real wages and living standard spilled out from urban 
to rural areas — but then differentially affect different cropping areas (and within areas 
landed versus non-landed households).  
The Indonesian budget process required that the actual amounts to be allocated to 
each region be decided at the time the project design was approved. No money could be 
spent on a project until the regional allocations we made.  The indicators of the regional 
severity of the crisis that were timely were either not complete or administratively 
acceptable. Data showing that particular areas were hard hit, or even that, in general, 
urban areas were hard hit but which did not have exactly comparable data for all 
administrative regions (provinces, districts) could not be used.  Finally, given the overall 
drastic reductions in real budgets (and real wages), the regional allocation of the JPS 
                                                 
the most rapidly growing economies in the world, where absolute consumption expenditure poverty fell by 
almost 50 percentage points (from 60 to 11 percent) between 1970 and 1996.  
9 This was documented with qualitative data from a nationwide “rapid response” survey even as early as 
October 1998 (Sumarto, Wetterberg, and Pritchett, 1998).  
 8
 budget was hotly contested by the regional governments and it was impossible to use 
anything other than administratively generated data. 
Individually available data.  In economies dominated by agriculture, self-
employment, and informal employment, there is no reliable administrative data on 
current income.  For those with formal sector employment, one can talk about “losing a 
job” or “becoming unemployed”, but this is not a key determinant of income or 
consumption changes.  Indonesia did in fact have a household list on something like 
poverty that was complete and administratively acceptable — but was not timely in that it 
was about levels of long-run “prosperity”, not the impact of the crisis.   
Indonesia has a system created by the National Family Planning Coordinating 
Agency (BKKBN) that classified every household in Indonesia into one of four levels of 
“prosperity” (BKKBN 1994).  A household was in the lowest welfare category (‘pre-
prosperous’) if any one of the five statements was true:  (i) the household cannot practice 
their religious principles, (ii) all household members do not eat at least twice a day, (iii) 
not all household members have different sets of clothing for home, work, school, and 
visits, (iv) the household cannot seek modern medical assistance for sick children and 
family planning services for contraceptive users, (iv) the largest floor area of house is 
made of earth.  This list had been compiled and updated annually by the village level 
workers (cadres) of the family planning agency for use in targeting contraceptive 
subsidies and efforts.11  Prior to the advent of the crisis programs there was little 
                                                 
 
10 On some of the outer islands the common reaction to queries to the impact of the crisis was hidup 
krismon (long live the monetary crisis) and there were anecdotes of motorbike dealers shipping their urban 
inventories to (some) rural areas to meet new demand.   
11 There is considerable uncertainty about how the cadres actually compiled the list (even after several 
discussions with the cadres in various regions).  It was supposed to be based on household visits but to say 
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 incentive for either individuals to be classified as family planning poor (or for regional 
governments to have a larger fraction of poor).  
I.C)  The JPS programs and their de jure targeting design 
The outcome of the mixed motivations, political pressures, and targeting 
constraints outlined above was a set of JPS programs, each with its own objectives and 
targeting criteria.  The Indonesian government’s approach was to group the JPS effort in 
four major areas:  food security, employment creation, education, and health.  Table 1 
summarizes the objectives, intended magnitude, and targeting of the major JPS programs, 
which we describe briefly before moving on to the four sections that describe the 
targeting results. 
Subsidized rice.  The largest program was a program called OPK (Operasi Pasar 
Khusus)12 that allowed each eligible household to purchase 20 kilograms of rice at the 
price of Rp 1,000/kg (in August 1998 the market price for medium quality rice was 
around Rp 3,000/kg13).  Households were eligible if they fell into either of the two lowest 
categories of the family planning agency’s “prosperity” ranking.14  A village 
representative was authorized to purchase each month an allotment of rice equal to 20 
kilograms times the number of eligible households in that village from the logistic 
                                                 
it was based on a “survey” overstates the formality and rigor of the process.  Also the list was not 
centralized or computerized but the list of household names was maintained at the local level and the higher 
levels of government only had access to summary reports of the numbers of households in each group.   
12 This means “special market operation” which was meant to distinguish these sales of rice by the logistics 
agency from their traditional market operations in which they bought and sold rice to stabilize prices.  
13 See ‘Recent Volatility in the Rice Market: Results of a SMERU Rapid Appraisal in Central and East 
Java’, SMERU Newsletter, No. 01, November 1998.  
14 Originally only the lowest category (KPS) was eligible. In response to reports that due to the prolonged 
economic crisis many KS-I households had fallen into KPS, the government expanded eligibility to include 
KS-I households. In effect, this increased the number of target from 7.3 to 12.8 million households (see 
Rahayu et al., 1998). 
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 agency’s (BULOG) local warehouse.  Households then purchased this rice in the village 
at the stipulated price (with some allowance for transport costs).   
 Scholarships and block grants.  This program had two major components: 
scholarships to individual students and block grants to schools, which, although it was an 
important part of the program we do not examine the targeting issues.15  There were 
scholarships at three levels: primary (SD), lower secondary, and upper secondary.  The 
scholarships was a substantial amount (Rp. 10,000, Rp. 20,000 and Rp. 30,000 per month 
for primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary school students respectively), which 
was intended to exceed both official and unofficial school fees.  The scholarships were 
paid directly to the students (or their families) twice a year via a cash transfer handled by 
the local post office.  Each school received a number of scholarships which they allocated 
to students by a school committee, consisting of the principal, a teacher representative, a 
student representative, the head of parent’s association (BP3, as the representative of the 
local community), and the village head. The scholarship recipients were selected 
according to their score on an administrative criteria the main element of which was that 
the child come from a household in the lowest two categories of the family planning 
“prosperity” status, but which also included the size of the family, the likelihood of a 
student dropping out, and the constraint that 50 percent of the scholarships went to girls.  
The decisions had to be approved by the committee.16  
                                                 
 
15 Since the block grants were targeted to schools at least conceivable we could examine the incidence of 
this program by examining the children who were in schools who received block grants — [has Jerry/SBG 
done something like this?] but households were not asked this in any of the available data sets. 
16 The criteria were explicit and disseminated to the schools. In principle, students selected to receive the 
scholarships were supposed to be from the poorest backgrounds. As a guidance, scholarships were to be 
allocated to children from household in the two lowest BKKBN rankings at first. If there were a large 
number of eligible students such that not all of the poor students could receive a scholarship, then 
additional indicators were used to identify the neediest students. These additional indicators included living 
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 Health.  One major health program was the provision of a health card (kartu 
sehat) to eligible households which entitled all members of the household to obtain free 
services from designated public health care centers for medical and family planning 
purposes,17 and services for ante-natal and child birth services from designated providers.  
Household eligibility in this program was based on village level lists primarily based on 
family planning prosperity status, with some modifications by local administration via a 
“health committee.”  While health services were to be provided free, the health units were 
not reimbursed for the provision of those services, rather there was a quite complicated 
financing scheme where, among other features, local clinic funds through the program 
were based on the number of health card holders in their administrative area and could 
only be used for certain items.  
                                                 
far from school, having physical handicaps, and those coming from large or single parent families. The 
only subjective input was school committee’s assessment of the recipients’ probability to drop out of 
schools without scholarships.  
17 This was primarily the primary health care clinics (Puskesmas) but also included some but not all 
services at a hospital.  This aspect of all services at some levels but only some services at others created a 
fair bit of confusion as health card holders felt they were being denied or charged for what should have 
been free services.    
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 Table 1:  Summary of JPS programs 
Program Description FY 98/99 
Budget 
billion Rp. 
(million 
US$)a 
Planned 
coverage 
Targeting in Fiscal Year 1998/99 
Geographic 
 
None OPK 
“subsidized 
rice” 
Sales of subsidized rice 
to targeted households 
5,450 12.8 million 
KPS and KS-I 
households 
 
Household BKKBN list 
Geographic Pre-crisis (1997) data on 
poverty rate by district 
PDM-DKE 
“village 
block grants” 
A ‘community fund’ 
program that provides 
block grants directly to 
villages for either public 
works or revolving fund 
for credit 
1,701  
Household 
 
Local decision making 
Geographic None, various ministries 
(e.g. Manpower, Forestry, 
Public Works) 
Padat Karya 
programs 
“labor 
creation” 
A loose, uncoordinated, 
collection of several 
‘labor intensive’ 
programs in a variety of 
government departments 
2,066 12.7 million 
man-days 
 
Household 
 
Weak self selection (by 
wage rate, but varied) 
Geographic Data on enrollment in 1997 SBG 
“scholarships
” 
Providing scholarships 
directly to elementary, 
lower secondary, and 
upper secondary  
students and block 
grants to selected 
schools 
1,138 6% of primary, 
17% of lower 
secondary, 
10% of upper 
secondary 
school students
Household School committees 
following criteria 
Geographic BKKBN pre-prosperous 
rates 
JPS-BK 
“health 
cards” 
Providing subsidies for 
medical services, 
operational support for 
health centers, medicine 
and imported medical 
equipment, family 
planning services, 
supplemental food, 
midwife services 
1,043 7.4 million 
KPS 
households Household BKKBN list 
a) US$ figures are indicative only, calculated at an exchange rate of 10,000 Rp/dollar.  
 
Labor creating  programs.  Unlike the above programs that had centralized design 
and implementation  the “labor creating” programs were really a diverse set of programs 
operated by different ministries and with different criteria--at one point there were 
seventeen different “labor creating” programs.  The unifying features were that 
individuals were paid for labor services and that the principal targeting was geographic 
and self-selection — individuals chose whether or not to work at the specified wages.   
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 Ferreira, Prennushi, and Ravallion (1999) stress that the impact is highest when programs 
use a relatively low wage rate as this ensures that only those in need will work (people 
will take, and return to, regular employment when available) and that as many people as 
possible can be employed.  This was not always the case in the programs and there was 
wide variability — the drought relief programs tended to pay wages in kind, the urban 
construction programs tended to have high wages, and many programs used the 
government legal minimum wage, which was higher than the market in some areas while 
lower in others.  
I.D)  Data sources to examine targeting: Program participation and consumption 
We used two principal sources to examine the targeting of the JPS programs: the 
national household survey (SUSENAS) and a panel survey done by BPS and UNICEF 
called the “100 Villages Survey.”  The SUSENAS is a nationally representative 
household survey covering over 200,000 households in each of the countries 341 
districts.18  
The 100 Villages Survey is a panel with five rounds:  May 1997 (pre-crisis), 
August 1998, December 1998, May 1999 and October 1999.  The May 1997 round of the 
100 Village Survey interviewed 120 households in each of ten villages in ten districts 
purposively chosen to represent various disadvantaged economic types (e.g. fishing 
villages, remote).  In subsequent rounds 80 of the original 120 households in each village 
                                                 
18 For the five levels of the administrative jurisdictions of Indonesia as of February 1999 we use the words:  
national, provincial (26, excluding East Timor), district (341), sub-district (4,044), village (roughly 
68,783).  Unless otherwise noted “districts” denotes the “level II local government” which includes both 
kabupaten (rural districts) and kota (cities that are districts).  Unless otherwise specified “village” includes 
both rural desa and urban kelurahan (note the Indonesian desa is not a “village” in the sense of a self-
contained cluster of residences but is an administrative jurisdiction that may include several such clusters).  
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 were re-interviewed to create a panel of around 8,000 households.19  
JPS module.  A module which asked households about their awareness of, 
participation in, and benefits from the JPS programs was fielded in December 1998 round 
of the 100 Villages Survey and then a substantially expanded version was included in the 
February 1999 SUSENAS.  The module, particularly in the 100 Villages Survey, asked 
whether households reported “participating” or “receiving benefits” from the JPS 
programs in the last three months.   
 Consumption module.  The “short form” questions on consumption expenditures 
were used in both the core SUSENAS and the 100 Villages survey and the consumption 
expenditures aggregate based on these questions was used throughout, with the exception 
in the footnote.20  
II)  JPS Program participation incidence: (mildly) progressive, remarkably uniform 
Empirical findings.  Since we cannot estimate the actual magnitude of the benefit 
from each of the programs, we focused on “participation incidence.” We define a 
program’s (static) participation incidence as the relationship between program coverage 
and household per capita expenditures. The coverage ratio of the jth JPS program in the ith 
region for the qth group of consumption expenditures (usually quintiles or deciles or more 
                                                 
 
19 In the original survey the 120 households were 60 from each of two census enumeration areas within the 
village.  In the later rounds this was changed to 40 from each of three enumeration areas.  Forty panel 
households in each enumeration area were chosen from the sixty original households, but by a process in 
which attrition was not documented:  if a panel selected household was not present then another was chosen 
to have a complete panel.  Since the rounds are relatively close together we believe that actual attrition was 
small but the caveat persists that the results are for those households located in subsequent rounds and are 
hence not representative of all households (Thomas 1999 discusses the issue of attrition bias).  
20 There was actually a big problem with the SUSENAS data because in 1999 the detailed  “consumption 
module” was administered to 65,000 households.  While in theory these households also received the short-
form consumption questions, it turns out that those households who received both the short form and 
detailed module set of questions had much higher recorded consumption than those households only asked 
the core questions (suggesting the prompted recall of the detailed module produced higher consumption 
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 broadly, any range of centiles (e.g. poor vs. non-poor)) is the fraction of those households 
in the region in the given group who report having participated in the program in the 
recall period.  
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We compute the coverage ratio separately for each district.  This is for two 
reasons.  First, we wish to avoid comparisons of “real” income across districts which, 
given the lack of comparable price data across urban and rural areas in Indonesia we 
regard as still problematic.  Second, rather than conflating the issues of how well the 
geographic targeting identified regions and how well within regions the programs 
reached poorer household.  We examine only how well programs targeted households 
relative only to other households within those regions.   The summary statistics are not 
national average targeting but the average of targeting within districts.   
Given the coverage ratios across the quintiles we can calculate three summary 
indicators of participation incidence that reflect consumption expenditure targeting.  First, 
the ratio of the coverage of the middle to the poorest quintile: 
i
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i
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Second, the same ratio of coverage ratios for the richest (QV) to poorest (QI) quintile.  
Third, we define the “targeting ratio” as the ratio of the fraction of the benefits of a 
program received by the non-poor relative to the non-poor in the population: 
                                                 
and the enumerators translated this over into the matching categories of the short-form).  Therefore we 
create separate quintiles for core and module households (See Sumarto, Suryahadi, and Widyanti, 2001).  
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In terms of coverage ratios and population shares the targeting ratio is: 
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This definition is compatible with either an absolute consumption expenditure definition 
of poverty (which produces as an outcome the fraction of the population in any given 
region poor and non-poor) or with the use of consumption expenditure percentiles.  We 
implement the targeting ratio by defining the bottom 20 percent of households by per 
capita consumption expenditures in each district as the region’s “poor.”     
If a program were untargeted in its availability and uptake were not related to 
expenditures then all of the targeting indicators (QIII/QI, QV/QI, TR) would be equal to 
1 (on average).  We can also define the best imaginable targeting indicators (lower is 
better targeting) as the targeting indicators that would result if program participation were 
strictly ordered by consumption expenditures.  In this case the graph of participation 
incidence would be step function equal to one up to some threshold level of expenditure 
(which is a function of total program budget/coverage) and zero thereafter.   
Table 2 reports the average coverage and the targeting indicators from the 
February 1999 SUSENAS—along with the maximum imaginable coverage of the bottom 
quintile and best imaginable targeting indicators. The targeting glass is definitely either 
half-full or half-empty.  On the half-full side all of the programs demonstrate some “pro-
poor” targeting.  A household in the middle quintile was only 59 percent (medical 
services) to 80 percent (subsidized rice) as likely as a household in the bottom quintile to 
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 have received benefits.  Households in the top quintile of expenditures were only around 
30 (medical services, employment creation) to 46 percent (subsidized rice) as likely to 
have participated in the JPS.  The targeting ratios were consistently better than a uniform 
transfer (which is itself progressive relative to the pre-tax/transfer distribution).  
On the half empty side the lack of perfect targeting meant that coverage amongst 
the poorest was much less than imaginable.  Had the “health card” been strictly targeted 
by expenditures 53 percent of the bottom quintile could have received the program—
whereas only 10.6 percent of the poorest quintile actually did (and similarly for other 
programs).   The targeting ratios suggest that participation of the non-poor (defined as the 
top 80 percent of the population) in JPS programs was about 90 percent of their share in 
the population.  About 75 percent of all program participants were not in the bottom 20 
percent of the expenditure distribution. 
 Table 2:  Average targeting of various JPS programs across districts of Indonesia 
SUSENAS, Feb 1999 
Maximum imaginable coverage and best 
imaginable expenditure targeting 
(uniform transfer=1) 
Ratio Ratio 
Program 
Quintile I  
Coverage QIII/QI QV/QI
Targeting
Ratio 
Quintile I 
coverage Q3/qi Q5/q1 
Targeting
Ratio 
Subsidized Rice 
 52.64 0.79 0.46 0.92 100.00 0.63 0.00 0.78
Employment 
Creation 8.31 0.70 0.30 0.88 41.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
Primary 
Scholarship  5.8 0.69 0.35 0.89 29.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lower Secondary 
Scholarship 12.15 0.69 0.40 0.89 60.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
Upper Secondary 
Scholarship 5.4 0.61 0.36 0.90 27.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Used Health Card  
 10.6 0.59 0.29 0.83 53.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:  a) Based on the unweighted average across districts.  
 
The results in table 2 are averages across districts, which conceal the enormous 
differences across districts in the measured targeting.  While part of this variability is 
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 sampling error (the median sample size by district was 606 households), there appears to 
be substantial variation in the extent to which the programs reached the poorest in each 
district (we return to this below).  Table 3 shows that in each program roughly half the 
districts have either uniform or pro-rich targeting while roughly half had targeting 
substantially better than a uniform transfer21.  
Table 3:  Distribution of targeting ratios across the districts of Indonesia 
Percent of districts in each targeting ratio class  
Program Mean TR Std Dev 
 
<0.7 
(sharply 
pro-poor)
 
0.7-0.9 
(pro-poor)
 
0.9-1.1 
(near 
uniform) 
 
>1.1 
(anti-
poor) 
Total 
Subsidized rice 0.91 0.10 2.39 38.57 57.00 2.05 100 
Employment 
creation 
0.87 0.27 23.02 26.98 32.01 17.99 100 
Primary scholarship 0.86 0.26 20.73 31.64 34.55 13.09 100 
Lower secondary 
scholarship 
0.86 0.25 23.10 28.16 35.38 13.36 100 
Upper secondary 
scholarship 
0.86 0.38 33.47 14.88 14.05 37.60 100 
Used Health Cards 0.83 0.29 25.69 35.42 20.14 18.75 100 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on February 1999 SUSENAS. 
 
 Even though the programs had very different administrative and targeting designs 
the participation incidence of the various JPS programs appears remarkably similar.  
While there are differences in the targeting indicators (the range of QIII/QI (middle/poor) 
ratios is 20 percentage points (.59 to .79) the JPS program incidence is similar when 
compared to the benefit incidence of other general, untargeted, government 
                                                 
21 This heterogeneity of targeting performance across regions with the same project design is similar to the 
finding in Coady, Hodinott and Grosh 2002 that across the range of programs they examine there were 
large variations across countries within the same type of program.  
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 expenditures22.  Figure 2 compares the participation incidence of the JPS programs to the 
spending on education (primary, junior secondary, upper secondary), health (PHCs, 
hospitals, the nutritional program) and the subsidy to kerosene.  While the JPS programs 
were not perfectly targeted to consumption expenditures they stand out as being similarly 
well targeted relative to these categories of general expenditures.  Only spending on 
primary education has anything like the incidence of the JPS programs23.   
 
                                                 
22 And these are categories that are generally thought to be desirable and reasonably well targeted—we do 
not even include items that are obviously biased towards the rich:  tertiary education, gasoline subsidies, 
the bailout of the banks in the financial crisis (World Bank 2001).  
23 And this is driven at least in part by the arbitrary assumption of zero economies of scale in household 
consumption (e.g. that households are ranked by θN
esExpenditurTotal , θ=1).  Since larger 
household have more children even if all children are enrolled in public schooling and hence the subsidy is 
equal per child the assumption makes it appear that more of the benefit accrues to poor households by 
making larger households appear poorer.  With θ=1 the QIII/QI ratio is .835, but if the economy of scale 
parameter assumes empirically plausible values the benefit appears much more uniform:  at θ=.8 
QIII/QI=.888, at θ=.6 then QIII/QI=.984. 
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 Figure 2:  JPS Participation Incidence versus benefit incidence of 
education, health, kerosene subsidy
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Interpretations.  The joint finding that the JPS programs were mildly 
progressively targeted to households with low consumption expenditures and that the 
degree of targeting was similar across programs raises two related questions:  (a) why 
were the programs targeted as they were, and (b) what accounts for the similarity in the 
targeting. There are three possible explanations.  First, the data did not exist that would 
have allowed the programs to be targeted to consumption expenditures and the programs 
were similar because they shared targeting criteria.  Second, targeting household’s 
current consumption expenditures was not really the program objective and consumption 
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 expenditures are only weakly related to those objectives.   Third, the underlying political 
economy precludes sharp targeting. 
The first potential explanation is that the household targeting in several of the 
programs relied on the family planning classification and that this classification was only 
weakly related to consumption expenditures.   This explanation has some pluses and 
minuses.  The “prosperity” classification is only weakly related to expenditures.  Table 4 
compares those who were “poor” and “non-poor” by ACE poverty and the family 
planning classification.  The fact that 57 percent of those who were family planning poor 
were also ACE poor implies some association between the two, but also implies that fully 
43 percent of the family planning poor were not ACE poor.  By the same token, only 57 
percent of those who were ACE poor were also family planning agency’s poor24.   
                                                 
24 This lack of association is worrisome, but there is no obvious conclusion one way or the other.  On the 
one hand, there has been a long literature arguing that both because of more accurate measurement and 
because of purposive consumption smoothing by households, current consumption expenditures are a better 
proxy for household’s long-run income than is current income.  But on the other, consumption expenditures 
has its own problems as a proxy of long-run household standard of living and it may well be that an asset 
based proxy like the family planning method provides a reasonable indicator of long-run welfare. Filmer 
and Pritchett (2001) show that a principal components based index based on asset ownership (e.g. owning a 
bicycle) and housing characteristics (e.g. having a toilet) performs at least as well as consumption 
expenditures in predicting child school attainment.  
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 Table 4: The association between the administrative data on household poverty 
(family planning agencies “pre-prosperous”) and ACE poverty 
 Poora 
 
Non-Poor Total 
Number of Pre-Prosperous households 3,357 2,523 5,880 
Percent of “Pre-Prosperous” 
households who are: 
57.1 42.9 100.0 
Percent of households who are “pre-
prosperous” (by poor/non-poor) 
57.0 41.3 49.0 
Total 5,889 6,108 11,997 
% Row 49.0a 51.0 100.0 
Source:  Based on Suryahadi, Suharso, and Sumarto, 1999. 
a The poverty line is chose so that ACE headcount poverty equals the proportion 
“pre-prosperous”.   
 
However, it is not clear that the weak association between family planning 
“prosperity” status and consumption expenditures is the explanation of the similarly mild 
JPS program targeting by expenditure,  for two reasons.  First, even for the subsidized 
rice program, in which the family planning classification was the only criteria, the 100 
Villages data show only a weak connection between family planning “prosperity” status 
and receiving OPK rice.  Table 6 shows that in the ten districts of the 100 Villages 
Survey the median coverage of those apparently not eligible (the family planning 
“prosperous”) was 70 percent of that of those eligible and the targeting ratio is only .85.  
This is no better targeting (in fact, a bit worse, .7 versus .54) than if the ratio of non-poor 
coverage is computed on a comparable basis using consumption expenditures (final 
column of table 6) 25.  This suggests that the program was as weakly targeted according to 
                                                 
25 Cameron (2002) shows that in the 100 Villages data using the self-reported BKKBN status the 
scholarships also did not strictly follow the classification, as the proportion of households receiving 
scholarships (either PS, JSS, USS) was: PS 11.6%, KS-I 7.11, KS-II 6.52, KS-III and above 1.22.  She also 
finds the in explaining scholarship receipt the level and change expenditures were statistically significant, 
even controlling for BKKBN status.  
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 the administrative eligibility criteria as according to consumption expenditures — which 
corresponds to observations about actual program administration (see section V).   
 
Table 5:  Evidence from the 100 Villages Survey About the Relationship Between Observed Family 
Planning Agency “poverty” (BKKBN PS) and OPK Program Participation 
Maximum 
Imaginable Targeting
District 
Percent 
BKKBN“
Poor” 
(PS) 
Coverage 
of the 
“BKKBN
poor” (PS)
Ratio of 
coverage 
of Non-
poor to 
poor 
(KS/PS) 
Targeting 
Ratio 
(proportion 
to non-
poor/non-
poor in 
population)
Maximum 
coverage 
of “poor” 
(PS) 
Minimum 
Targeting
Ratio  
Coverage of 
consumption 
expenditure
Non-
poor/poor1 
Banjarnegara, Central 
Java 
 
60.33 91.16 0.91 0.95 100.0 0.79 0.83a 
Indragiri Hilir, Riau 41.42 23.54 0.51 0.72 40.6 0.00 0.36 b 
Karang Asem, Bali 37.42 20.27 1.34 1.10 65.7 0.00 0.45 b 
Kendari, Southeast 
Sulawesi 
 
76.08 62.87 0.48 0.55 72.4 0.00 0.53 c 
Kupang, East Nusa 
Tenggara 
 
75.04 41.94 0.51 0.58 49.1 0.00 0.50 c 
Kutai, East Kalimantan 19.93 21.34 0.72 0.93 83.3 0.00 3.58 d 
Lampung Selatan, 
Lampung 
 
59.75 49.65 0.88 0.92 79.1 0.00 0.81a 
Pandeglang, West Java 27.25 23.24 0.33 0.64 43.4 0.00 0.68 b 
Rembang, Central Java 61 87.98 0.67 0.77 100.0 0.52 0.56a 
Sumedang, West Java 31.92 7.83 1.98 1.19 41.0 0.00 0.48b 
Median:   0.70 0.85   0.54 
Source:  Based on Suryahadi, Sumarto, and Suharso 1999, tables 2a and 2b. 
Using the quintiles corresponding most closely to the fraction “pre-prosperous” (PS) as the “non-poor” 
depending on the BKKBN poverty rate in teach district for this with (a) we use QI-QIII at the 
consumption expenditure poor, while for other districts it is (b) QI-QII, (c) QI-QIV poor, (d) QI poor. 
 
This weak relationship between family planning agency poverty and OPK receipt 
suggests that even though the program nominally used this criteria in targeting, this likely 
does not account for the similarity in program incidence.  Table 6 shows the relationship 
in the October 1999 round of the 100 Villages Survey between whether a household 
reports receiving a health card (which provided eligibility for free medical services) and 
having received OPK rice.  Even by October 1999 the health card program coverage was 
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 still much smaller than OPK (12.4 percent versus 56.1 percent).  Interestingly, only 1.9 
percent of households did have a health card but did not receive rice, so only 15 percent 
of health card recipients did not receive rice. But the converse is not true:  only one in 
five households who received rice also had a health card.   
 
Table 6:  Relationship between participation in two JPS programs (subsidized rice and health 
cards) which both used family planning poverty (BKKBN PS) status as an eligibility criteria 
(from October 1999 100 Villages Survey). 
HH received Subsidized Rice ('OPK')   
  Yes No Total 
Yes  1,121 (10.54) 
202 
(1.90) 
1,323 
(12.43) 
No 4,850 (45.58) 
4,467 
(41.98) 
9,317 
(87.57) 
 HH Received  
Health 
Card 
  
  
  Total 
5,971 
(56.12) 
4,669 
(43.88) 
10,640 
(100.00) 
 
While the family planning classification was a de jure element of eligibility for 
several of the programs, this does not entirely account for the similar mild program 
participation incidence according to consumption expenditures.  While it is true the 
family planning criteria are only weakly related to consumption expenditures (Table 4), 
the family planning poverty criteria were not followed so closely so as to produce 
program incidence similarity (Tables 5 and 6).  
The second explanation of the mild relationship of program participation to 
consumption expenditures is that the JPS programs were not intended to be exclusively 
targeted to the consumption expenditure poor.  The targeting of each JPS program must 
be assessed relative to the complex mix of actual objectives, not merely the idealized or 
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 rhetorical objectives.26   At least three classes of objectives that could account for only 
mild expenditure targeting played a role in the design and targeting of the JPS 
programs.27    
First, the education and health programs were intended to avert specific adverse 
outcomes (drop-out, worsening health status) not to reduce ACE poverty as the protection 
of household’s consumption/investment of certain “merit goods” was regarded as a 
concern independent of poverty.  Therefore nothing about the programs being strongly or 
weakly targeted with respect to expenditures can be used to infer either whether the 
programs were targeted as designed or whether that design was optimal relative to its 
objective.  That is, there should be no confusion between “targeting leakage” in the sense 
that households with high consumption expenditure received program benefits and 
“administrative leakage” in the sense that program benefits were diverted from the 
intended recipients.  For instance, the scholarships program has had close, independent, 
monitoring which suggests that the targeting procedures were adhered to reasonably 
closely in designating the individual students to receive the scholarships.   One cannot 
infer from “weak” expenditure targeting that the program was not implemented as 
designed.  Moreover, it is possible that in a program perfectly targeted to avert drop-out 
the targeting would be only weakly related to expenditures because expenditures are only 
a weak predictor of drop-out.  In fact, Cameron (2002) uses the 100 Villages Survey data 
to show that although the level and change in expenditures had some explanatory power 
                                                 
26 While occasionally there was a simplistic statement that the JPS programs were intended to “reduce 
poverty” more frequently the government and donor descriptions said something like the JPS programs 
were intended to “reduce poverty, mitigate the social impact, maintain human capital investment and 
sustain employment” (TKPPJPS, 1999), which was reflective of the true range of program objectives.   
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 for primary school drop-out, neither of these were actually statistically significant in 
predicting lower secondary or upper secondary drop out.  But the “perfectly targeted to 
drop-out” explanation of the weak relationship to expenditures is made suspect by the 
fact that Cameron (2002) finds no impact of scholarships on primary or upper secondary 
drop-out and only a modest impact in lower secondary (3.5 percent). 
Second, an explicit “non-poverty” objective of the employment creation program 
was to mitigate the loss of household income--even for non-poor households.  Since the 
family planning poverty classification was essentially “static”—both because it was 
updated only once a year and many of the criteria are based on relatively persistent 
criteria (housing conditions, clothing ownership)--it could easily miss large changes in 
household welfare.     
Third, there were a number of other objectives of the JPS programs that militated 
against sharp targeting. By late 1998 it was felt that a problem in Indonesia was 
insufficient fiscal stimulus and that the government deficit was not large enough on a 
cyclically corrected basis and hence that the government should increase spending.  This 
meant that being able to rapidly disburse relatively large amounts of purchasing power in 
order to maintain adequate absorption was an additional JPS program objective. 
Programs which disbursed money for immediate labor creation (especially in a regionally 
balanced way) were attractive. The JPS programs were being designed literally in the 
                                                 
27 The existence of the JPS programs owed a great deal to the politically driven desire of both the 
government and the international financial institutions to be seen to be acting in this area, but did not 
determine design. 
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 shadow of burned out buildings and with ongoing protests and hence there was a desire to 
design programs that could generate political support.28  
The final possible explanation of the mild (better than uniform but not sharply 
pro-poor) and similar expenditure targeting of the JPS programs is that some mix of 
national and local political economy considerations preclude sharp expenditure targeting 
(Gelbach and Pritchett 2002).  If this is the case, then while some targeting will produce a 
pro-poor distribution of benefits, it is possible there is no program design that would 
produce a substantially more targeted distribution of benefits that than observed.  If this is 
the case then some targeting mechanism will produce more progressive benefit incidence 
than no targeting, but no de jure targeting design would be able to produce extremely 
sharp targeting (except perhaps for very small programs) as it would thwarted 
politically—we return to this issue in the final section. 
 
III)  Dynamic versus static participation incidence:  Safety nets versus safety ropes 
As has been emphasized in recent literatures on the changes in poverty status over 
time (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000; Jalan and Ravallion, 2000; Dercon and Krishnan, 
2000) the change in the average poverty rate masks enormous “churning” as households 
                                                 
 
28 In addition to the above, which we suspect are quite universal in the launch of crisis programs, we also 
suspect that the interests of agencies and units of the government played a considerable role in the 
composition of the JPS programs.  Three instances are worth mentioning.  One, the logistics agency had a 
long history of price stabilization activity in basic staples, but was under fire for having been deeply 
involved in a fair bit of corrupt activity in connection with the monopoly in trade in certain commodities (in 
connection with the first family).  Many people (including the IMF and World Bank) were recommending 
not just an end to the monopoly restrictions in items like wheat flour but also abolition of the agency itself.  
A second example is that with the budget under pressure the only avenue for protecting existing programs 
or gaining incremental revenue was to classify the activities as under the umbrella of JPS.  In this way 
agencies had the incentive to simply re-label any activity that used labor as a “labor creating” program.  A 
third example is that the take home pays of local officials depended in complicated ways on the 
implementation of “development budget” programs.  Since nearly all new investment was being cut from 
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 move in and out of poverty.  All of the panel surveys in Indonesia show enormous 
volatility in poverty rates over this period (for the IFLS see Frankenberg, Thomas, Beegle 
1999).  Table 7 shows the pattern of changes in household poverty status across four 
rounds of the 100 Villages Survey spanning 14 months. While 42 percent of this 
population are never poor, 58 percent are ACE poor at least once—even though only less 
than a third of that figure are always poor (17.5 percent) and the average poverty rate is 
37 percent.   While at least some substantial fraction of the measured changes in 
household consumption reflect the difficulty of measuring expenditures accurately, this 
also reflects the large changes in households fortunes even over short periods of time—as 
households gain and lose jobs, harvests are good (or bad), business goes well or badly. 
This volatility creates the demand not just for transfer programs to those whose 
incomes are chronically low (safety nets) but also for informal and formal insurance like 
mechanisms and programs that would pay off not only when income was absolutely low, 
but also when households experienced negative shocks (safety ropes).  
 
                                                 
the budget, this meant that unless local officials were responsible for the implementation of JPS programs 
in the development budget their own effective take home pays would be cut.   
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 Table 7.  The Patterns of Changes in Household Poverty Status 
Poverty Status in:  
Pattern of 
poverty status 
 
Aug ’98 Dec ’98 May ’99 Oct ’99 
Household 
Frequency 
(%) 
Always poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 17.5 
Poor Poor Poor Non-poor 4.6 
Poor Poor Non-poor Poor 2.0 
Poor Non-poor Poor Poor 2.9 
Three times 
poor 
(12.0%) 
Non-poor Poor Poor Poor 2.5 
Poor Poor Non-poor Non-poor 3.7 
Poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 3.0 
Poor Non-poor Non-poor Poor 1.4 
Non-poor Poor Poor Non-poor 1.7 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Poor 1.0 
Twice poor 
(12.4%) 
Non-poor Non-poor Poor Poor 1.6 
Poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor 7.9 
Non-poor Poor Non-poor Non-poor 3.2 
Non-poor Non-poor Poor Non-poor 2.7 
Once poor 
(15.9%) 
Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor Poor 2.1 
Never poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor Non-poor 42.2 
Source:  Widyanti, Sumarto, and Suryahadi, 2001, table 3. 
 
 Static participation incidence is the relationship between program participation 
and the level of expenditures.  Graphically the coverage ratio is the height at any given 
level (or range) of expenditures and hence the targeting is the slope (either at a point or 
over a range, such as comparing coverage for different quintiles).  The exact analogy can 
be made for dynamic participation incidence as a relationship between program 
participation and changes (absolute or proportionate) in consumption expenditures (or 
income).  Figure 3 shows the exact analogy of the static participation incidence in figure 
2 for the showing the relationship between JPS program participation in December 1998 
and the natural log change in household per person expenditures between May 1997 and 
August 1998.  Unlike static incidence the dynamic incidence is very different across the 
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 programs.  Only for the employment creation programs were households substantially 
more likely to participate if they experienced a bad shock to consumption expenditures.  
 
Figure 3:  Dynamic participation incidence of the JPS programs
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The graph of participation incidence including both levels and changes in (natural 
log) consumption expenditure is a three dimensional surface.  Different programs can 
have different coverage and targeting performances with respect to expenditure levels 
and shocks so that one program’s incidence graph could be steep with respect to 
expenditures at all levels of shock flat (non-targeted) with respect shocks, or vice versa. 
A pure “safety rope” program could be sharply targeted with respect to shocks but flat in 
the expenditures dimension.  Figures 4a and 4b show the combined static and dynamic 
participation incidence for two of the programs: OPK and employment creation. Not 
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 surprisingly, the self-selection program has enormously better dynamic benefit incidence 
than the administratively targeted OPK program as households who need assistance have 
an easier time accessing program benefits29.  
                                                 
29 This suggests that the screening argument for the use of “workfare” requirements (Besley and Coate 
1992) appears to work well in changes but no in levels.  These results contrasting the labor creating 
schemes to other programs are in some ways similar and in some ways different from findings about the 
public employment scheme TRABAJAR in Argentina (Jalan and Ravallion 2002, Ravallion 2002b).  They 
find that TRBAJAR was much better targeted in static benefit incidence—76 percent of participants were 
from households in the bottom quintile—and had much better benefit incidence than other “protected” 
expenditures.  
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Figure 4a:  Probability of household participation in OPK program 
by quintiles of level and changes in expenditures
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Figure 4b:  Probability of household participation in employment creation programs 
by quintiles of level and changes in expenditures
 
 
Interpretations.  The now ubiquitous metaphor of a “social safety net” conflates 
two distinct objectives in the design of transfer programs.  One objective might be to 
minimize a measure of income or expenditure poverty.30  An alternative objective might 
be to mitigate risk — reduce household vulnerability to the wide variety of potential 
adverse shocks they could face (death, accident, fire, crop loss, job loss) — whether or 
not the shocks push households below some absolute threshold.  If the targeting of social 
                                                 
30  This general definition of poverty covers any of the class of Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) measures of 
poverty which adjust for the intensity or depth of poverty and is consistent with either absolute or relative 
poverty lines.  
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 programs is judged exclusively on poverty or benefit incidence based on a cross sectional 
snapshot then risk mitigation programs benefiting households who have suffered large 
shocks but who are not “poor” may appear to have large “leakage” (a type II targeting 
error, reaching people who are not intended beneficiaries) when in fact they are simply 
serving an alternative social objective. 
The undifferentiated metaphor of “safety net” can also confuse thinking about the 
political economy of transfer programs.31   Government may want to implement “safety 
net” and “safety rope” programs for completely different reasons.32  While a “safety net” 
program might be more popular the more effectively it transfers from richer to poorer 
households a “safety rope” program might cause little net redistribution but be popular 
because it serves an important insurance function in transferring resources from good 
states to bad states. 
Designing programs that deal with shocks to income (either at the economy wide or 
individual level) requires mechanisms that allow individuals to be added to program 
participation dynamically.  This requires either self-selection targeting or “open” 
administrative criteria—that is, the eligibility criteria need to have a mechanism for 
households to be added (and subtracted).  
                                                 
31 In OECD countries, the distinction has been used to characterize different “systems”, that is those that 
rely on means testing versus those that provide universal benefits (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Goodin et al, 
1999). 
32  Economists would recommend poverty programs to a hypothetical benign social welfare maximizer if 
the social welfare function was built up from individual (household) utility functions with declining 
marginal utility, in which case a (costless) transfer from rich to poor is not a Pareto improvement but does 
raise social welfare.  There is also an argument for poverty programs from an externality in altruism.  In 
contrast, the normative case for government involvement in mitigation of risk is based on the argument 
that, if moral hazard and adverse selection are sufficiently large then welfare improving markets for 
insurance against these risks will not exist (and they will be “too small” in any case).  This is potentially the 
case in a wide variety of insurance markets — but particularly affect the market for insurance of incomes.   
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 IV)  Marginal and average incidence in the JPS programs 
In an important paper Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) stress that for decisions about 
program expansion the relevant incidence measure is the marginal not average incidence.   
In what they characterize as “early” capture programs, the non-poor are more likely to 
receive benefits than the poor from the beginning of the program.33  If this is so then 
marginal incidence will be higher than average incidence.  An example might be 
secondary education in which the richer households are likely to be the first to enroll so at 
low levels average incidence will be regressive, but as schooling moves towards 
universality the incremental child is likely to be from a poorer household than the average 
child already enrolled so the marginal incidence will be more progressive than average 
incidence.   In contrast, with “late” capture, the program is well targeted to the poor at 
low levels of coverage but as the program expands the marginal incidence is worse than 
average and hence targeting falls.  
We find no systematic pattern of either “early” or “late” capture in the Indonesian 
JPS programs34:  (a) larger programs were not systematically more or less targeted than 
smaller programs; (b) within the JPS programs, districts with higher coverage had only a 
weak tendency to have worse static participation incidence (as measures by the targeting 
ratio); (c) as programs evolved over time they did not become more or less targeted.  
                                                 
33 “Early” and “late” do not necessarily imply timing, it could also be “small” and “large” in a cross 
section.  
34 We should point out that our “targeting ratios” results are not based on the same measure as the 
“targeting differential" (TD) given by the difference between per-capita allocations to the poor versus non-
poor used in Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999).  
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  Across programs.   Looking at table 2 one can see that programs with higher total 
coverage did not in fact have better targeting.  OPK was substantially larger than any of 
the programs, but the targeting was roughly equal.    
Coverage and targeting across regions.   The substantial regional variation in the 
resources available for each program (principally driven by the geographic targeting 
rules) created substantial variation in the coverage across regions for the same programs.  
If incidence is a function of coverage then,TR ),( jjj ZCRf=  and if more goes to the 
expenditure poor as coverage expands then the targeting ratio would fall ( 0<∂CRTR∂ ) 
while if there is “late” capture then the targeting ratio should rise as coverage expands 
( 0>∂∂ CRTR ).  Table 9 examines this issue in two ways and shows that there is some 
consistent, but weak, evidence of “late” capture—targeting ratios generally were higher 
(less targeted) in regions where program coverage was larger.  But the impact is very 
weak: in a power series approximation to a non-parametric regression the total 
explanatory power of all transformations of the coverage ratios is between 3 and 8 
percent of the variation across districts in targeting, moving from low to moderate 
coverage (5 to 15 percent) increased the targeting ratio (made programs less targeted) by 
between .03 (Rice, Employment) to .06 to .08 (the scholarship programs).     So, there is 
some evidence that the programs did a modestly better job of limiting the benefits to the 
poor at very low levels of coverage.   
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 Table 8:  The (weak) relationship between targeting ratios and program coverage 
A)  Mean and Standard Deviation (in parenthesis) of Targeting Ratio By Groups of Coverage 
Scholarships 
Coverage Ratio (%) OPK Employment Creation Primary Junior Senior 
Health 
CR< 5 0.87 (0.21) 
0.86 
(0.33) 
0.84 
(0.30) 
0.81 
(0.34) 
0.83 
(0.45) 
0.82 
(0.35) 
5 < CR <10 0.92 (0.12) 
0.86 
(0.15) 
0.92 
(0.10) 
0.90 
(0.22) 
0.90 
(0.26) 
0.82 
(0.22) 
10 < CR <20 0.87 (0.11) 
0.89 
(0.11) 
0.91 
(0.08) 
0.89 
(0.13) 
0.89 
(0.25) 
0.86 
(0.14) 
CR > 20 0.93 (0.06) 
0.93 
(0.57) 
0.88 
(0.05) 
0.92 
(0.10) 
0.95 
(0.15) 
0.90 
(0.74) 
Total 0.91 (0.10) 
0.87 
(0.27) 
0.86 
(0.26) 
0.86 
(0.25) 
0.86 
(0.38) 
0.83 
(0.29) 
B)  Results of non-parametric regression of Targeting Ratio on Coverage Across districts1 
R2 of regression .115 .007 .055 .052 .008 .053 
Predicted Targeting ratio at 
CR=5% 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.82 0.86 0.81 
Predicted Taregeting ratio at 
CR=15% 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.92 0.87 
Change in predicted TR from 
10 percentage point increase 
in coverage (positive is 
weaker targeting) 
0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.08 0.06 0.06 
1) Since we are completely agnostic about the functional form (we have no reason to 
believe the relationship is linear) we estimate a functional form that includes powers 
and transformations of the coverage ratio.  This can be thought of as a non-
parametric approximation to any functional form.  Since the slope is not constant we 
simply calculate the change across two points to give an “arc slope.” 
jjjjjjjj CRCRCRCRCRCRTR εβββββββ +++++++= )ln()/1(**** 6544332210  
 
 
Figure 5 shows the graph of the targeting ration and the coverage ratio across 
districts.  The principal relationship between coverage and targeting is that programs in 
districts with very low coverage show, not surprisingly, very variable results in the 
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 targeting ratio.  In districts with few recipients at times all went to non-poor households 
and at times all benefits went to poor households (TR=0). 
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Figure 5:  Relationship between Targeting Ratio and Total Coverage
0
0
Coverage and program targeting over time.   The 100 villages Survey asked 
households about JPS participation in the Dec 1998 to October 1999 rounds, which 
allows some examination of the dynamics of targeting during the expansion in program 
 38
 coverage in the subsidized rice and health card (medical services) programs35.   As 
Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) explain, with early capture (in which richer households 
receive benefits first) the expansion in coverage of the poor should be higher than the 
expansion in average coverage (and vice versa for “late” capture).  These two programs 
have different patterns. The OPK program appears to have expanded in these 10 districts 
roughly neutrally—over the 10 months average coverage increased 15.4 percent and 
quintile I coverage by 18.8 percent. 
By contrast the medical services/health card program shows an interesting dynamic of 
early capture. This program was slow to gain momentum as a JPS program and when the 
program was very small (only 3.8 percent) it had worse than uniform targeting, with more 
going to the richer than poorer households.  As the program first came to scale from 
December 1998 to May 99 as a JPS program it went disproportionately to the poor 
households—coverage among the poor increased by 11.7 percentage points (from 3.8 to 
15.5) while average coverage increased by only 6 percentage points.  The expansion from 
May to October appears to have been roughly neutral—with quintile I coverage 
increasingly modestly less than average coverage (2.7 versus 3.9 percentage points).  
This suggests that, as the program of health cards and subsidized medical services went 
from being a “regular” program to a crisis JPS program it moved from the typical pattern 
of middle class capture to decidedly pro-poor in the early phases of expansion.  However, 
as the program matured it became less targeted.  
 
                                                 
35 The scholarship program was at full scale from its beginning and the employment creation programs 
actually contracted over this period.   
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  Table 9:  Changes in targeting during program expansion  
Ratio of coverage ratios:  
 
Quintile I 
coverage QIII/QI QV/QI Targeting Ratio AVG 
Subsidized Rice 
Dec-98 47.93 0.90 0.62 0.96 40.73 
May-99 66.29 0.87 0.68 0.96 56.45 
Oct-99 66.74 0.86 0.65 0.95 56.11 
Change Dec 98 
to Oct 99 18.81 -0.04 0.03 0.00 15.38 
Medical Services  
Dec-98 3.80 1.44 1.52 1.07 5.22 
May-99 15.49 0.65 0.49 0.91 11.23 
Oct-99 18.20 0.84 0.72 0.95 15.13 
Change Dec 98 
to Oct 99 14.40 -0.60 -0.80 -0.12 9.91 
Source:  Widyanti, Sumarto, Suryahadi 2002 (adapted from table 7). 
 
Interpretations.  In is understandable that many government programs are “early 
capture” as richer and more informed and powerful households would be the first to gain 
benefits but that expansion would lead to better incidence36. But one might have thought 
that “safety net” programs were likely to be “late capture” programs—that is, it would be 
easier to create strong targeting of benefits in smallish programs, designed and designated 
for “the poor”   
V) De jure versus de facto targeting—community influence on targeting 
 A recent strand of the literature on targeting has examined the possibilities of 
using “communities” to target benefits to households.  The idea is that local communities 
have quite good information on both the level and shocks to households welfare and 
hence if local decision making structures could be structured that used that local 
                                                 
 
36 Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) show that even the anti-poverty programs tend to be “early capture” with 
higher marginal than average odds of participation (Integrated Rural Development Program and the Public 
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 knowledge then targeting could be improved without the high costs of improving 
administrative targeting or self-selection targeting.  However, note the “if” in the 
previous sentence is a very big if.  To use the superior local knowledge about conditions 
“communities” must be given discretionary power to allocate benefits.  But this 
discretion could either lead to superior targeting or to elite capture (Platteau 2000, 
Bardhan and Mookerjee 2000) or to community pressures for more “spreading” of the 
benefits.  Galasso and Ravallion (2002) use data from Bangladesh’s Food-for-Education 
Program to show that power in community decision making clearly affected outcomes 
(and that centralized allocations to villages were not particularly pro-poor).  We examine 
this issue with the Indonesian JPS with in three bits of evidence:  discussion of the OPK, 
examining the non-income determinants of program receipt, and evidence from the Local 
Level Institutions study linking individual and community social characteristics and 
program distribution.      
OPK distribution at the village.   The SUSENAS and 100 Villages data indicate 
unambiguously that the de jure program distribution was not followed.  While the rice 
allocated to a village area was (nearly always) based on the number of eligible 
households, the rice was allocated to more than the eligible households—tables 1 and 2 
show that  almost twice as many households received the rice than if the program 
guidelines has been followed and almost a quarter of households in the richest group still 
receive the program benefits.   
                                                 
Distribution System) although the public works program as better targeted than either and marginal and 
average odds more similar than for the other two programs. 
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 These quantitative findings accord well with anecdotal reports, as from the 
beginning of the program observers noted that observers noticed that the local leaders 
responsible for implementation were not adhering to the list of eligible households, but 
rather were distributing the rice amongst a much larger group.  As a result, while each 
eligible household in many cases received lesser amount of rice than stipulated in the 
program, other households, which were not officially eligible, also received an allocation 
(Tim Dampak Krisis SMERU, 2000).  The centrally planned administrative guidelines 
apparently often proved socially unacceptable at the community level (Suryahadi and 
Sumarto 2002).  
It is not at all clear whether the deviations at the local level were a “good” or 
“bad” thing.  There are three main arguments made by village heads (kepala desa) to 
justify this practice37.  First, the official list is not an accurate list of those who are in 
need, as due to the crisis, many households which formerly were not poor are also now in 
need of assistance.  Second, even if the list is accurate, the distinctions drawn are too 
fine: the differences between those households who are entitled and those who are not 
does not justify one group receiving 10-20 kg of rice while the remainder receive 
nothing.  Third, village heads and community leaders argue that the targeted distribution 
of this central government benefit is inconsistent with the spirit of community solidarity 
and self-help (gotong royong).  The village heads point out that, if everyone is expected 
to contribute their labor to community projects, then everyone should also benefit from 
the unexpected windfall of assistance from the central government.   
                                                 
37 This draws on reports of visits as well as the authors’ own experiences.  
 42
 These arguments raise important questions about the structure of the “optimal 
feasible” targeting as communities may know better than the central government and the 
BKKBN classification the best distribution of rice within any given community and local 
leaders may know better what is socially and politically feasible.  Rice that went to “non-
eligible” households, while inconsistent with the program guidelines was not necessarily 
mis-targeting.  Moreover, local social pressures around “fairness” clearly led to more 
uniform distribution, but which implied lesser benefit for the poor.   
On the other hand, providing too much discretion, and particularly discretion 
without conditions for adequate local oversight can lead to abuses.  Olken et al. (2000) 
shows that local politics appeared to play some role in the way village heads distribute 
OPK rice.  Anecdotal reports exist of local leaders abusing discretion in the OPK and in 
other social programs.     
 Household demographic and social characteristics and JPS program allocation.  
The 100 Villages survey, in addition to having multiple rounds, also has information on 
household’s participation in a variety of social organizations.  We can examine 
empirically whether these social characteristics played a role in program allocations, over 
and above the household’s wealth (as proxied by assets), education, and consumption 
expenditures as well as other characteristics.  Table 10 reports the percentage change in 
the likelihood of program participation for the various programs for households of 
differing demographic composition and social behaviors.  The demographic 
characteristics of households do not appear to play a large role, with two prominent 
exceptions—children in female headed households were much more likely to receive 
scholarships, which is reassuring as this was part of program design and people in female 
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 headed households were much less likely to participate in labor creating programs, again 
not surprisingly as the “first round” programs did little to encourage female participation.       
 The social characteristics present a different pattern.  There is no question that, 
statistically speaking, household membership in various social organizations played a 
role in the receipt (or not) of the JPS programs.  Nearly all of the coefficients are 
statistically significant, and, for various variables, quantitatively significant as well (10 
percent or more change in the probability of program participation)—but the pattern if 
signs is difficult to interpret.  For instance, members of religious organizations were 
consistently less likely to have received program benefits—but was this because decision 
making procedures were biased against them somehow, or because they were less likely 
to attempt to access the programs.   Having a member of the household in the government 
organized women’s association (PKK) makes individuals more likely to receive 
scholarships or use the health card, but much less likely to participate in a labor creating 
program. 
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 Table 10:  Influence of household demographic and social characteristics on participation in JPS 
programs, from three rounds of the 100 Villages Survey 
OPK Scholarship Health PK 
 
Mean of 
variable 
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt  Sig
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig. 
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Individual Membership in government/social organizations (from previous 100 Villages Round) 
Women’s organization (PKK) 0.276 -2.38%* 24.10%** 16.75%** -29.12%** 
Neighborhood organization  0.223 3.44%** -13.50%** -12.34%** -24.14%** 
Youth Organization  0.132 3.65%** 3.79% -8.70%** -10.16%** 
Burial society  0.518 4.06%** -2.12% -3.49% 60.41%** 
Sport Organization  0.195 5.07%** 20.46%** -6.45%** -18.42%** 
Religious  0.660 -9.74%** -10.49%** -0.02% -24.68%** 
Rotating help/credit (arisan)  0.331 -2.38%* 24.10%** 16.75%** -29.12%** 
Household characteristics 
Age of the HH head 43.868 -0.34%** 0.65%** -0.44%** -0.44%** 
Number of HH members 5.503 -0.31% 11.39%** -0.57% -1.15% 
Female headed household 0.047 0.62% 43.65%** 1.10% -42.43%** 
Married head of household 0.939 2.65% -23.48%** -6.91% -14.24%* 
pred p  0.514 0.0658 0.069 0.0486 
Psuedor2  0.242 0.112 0.103 0.217 
N  133637 88853 133637 133637 
Note:  The “percentage change” in the likelihood of program receipt is the marginal effect from the probit 
estimates divided by the underlying predicted probability for each program.   
Also included in all regressions:  consumption expenditures, change in consumption expenditures (since 
last round), binary variables for nine asset ownership (e.g. radio, TV, bicycle), education of household 
head, sector of employment, employment status (see Appendix table A.1). 
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 Village characteristics and JPS program allocations.    The Local Level 
Institutions study collected detailed information about social activities from individuals in 
48 villages in rural Indonesia.  From these detailed data four measures of “social” activity 
can be derived (Alatas, Pritchett, and Wetterberg 2002): participation in “social 
organizations”—social activities in groups with fixed membership, leadership, “social 
network”—social activities in spontaneous groups, “sociability”—frequency of 
household visits to friends and relatives, “participation in village governance 
organizations”—membership in the groups that were created to administer the desa.   
Alatas, Pritchett and Wetterberg (2002) show these distinctions have different impacts on 
desa governance.  Using the distinction between a households own social activities and 
the average frequency of the sampled households in the same village (less the household) 
we can examine whether the households’ own social connections affect distribution 
(private benefits) versus whether the density of social activity in the village itself makes a 
difference (externality type effects).   Table 11 shows that the associations are weak and 
vary across types of activity.  Living in a village where social network activity is high is 
associated with higher program participation (for labor creation, health significantly so, 
less so for scholarships and credit).   Similarly, living in a village with high level of social 
organizations raises the likelihood of household participation (which, since the average 
village participation is fixed likely reflects greater spreading of the benefits).  
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 Table 11:  Likelihood of program receipt and social characteristics of individuals and villages 
OPK 
Labor 
Creating Health Scholarships Credit 
Average 
engagement in social 
activities 
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig. 
Percentage 
change in 
likelihood 
of 
program 
receipt Sig.
Household -0.61%  -0.38%  -3.40%  -14.75%  7.60%  
Social 
Organizations 
Village 
(less 
household) 20.75% *** -0.19%  -11.54%  6.60%  13.36%  
Household 0.65%  -0.13%  -1.73%  0.93%  0.72%  
Social 
Network 
Village 
(less 
household) -3.79% * 4.75% *** 20.52% *** 6.71%  5.32%  
Household 0.27%  2.01% *** 5.19%  -9.55%  16.17% ***
Village 
Government 
Village 
(less 
household) 2.98%  -0.65%  -6.12%  21.33%  -16.43%  
Sociability Visits to others 0.62%  -0.38%  0.69%  5.70% ** 0.37%  
Note:  The “percentage change” in the likelihood of program receipt is the marginal effect from the 
probit estimates divided by the underlying predicted probability for each program.   
Also included in all regressions:  quintiles consumption expenditures, change in consumption 
expenditures (since the previous round in 1996), a principal components index of assets, education of 
household head, age of the head, and binary variables for female headship, agricultural worker, 
government worker, employment status (of head and spouse) and district.   
 
 Perhaps the most interesting result is the contrast between the JPS programs and 
the “credit” programs run by the government that channeled resources to specific 
activities.   A person who belonged to the government administrative apparatus was much 
more likely to have gotten credit than a household who was not.  At the same time, living 
in a village in which other people participate in the village governance organizations 
reduces the likelihood of receiving credit.   JPS programs do not appear to have been 
“captured” by local governments or their agents. 
 We try and examine the quality of village targeting and its relation to social 
characteristics in a two-step procedure.  First, we regress program participation only on 
economic criteria (e.g. linear to quartic terms in (natural log) consumption expenditures, 
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 change in expenditures, wealth, whether the HH head or spouse is unemployed, 
education, and HH size) and rank households by the predicted values of this equation.  
Our measure of targeting performance is the fraction of the Nv households in each village 
who did receive the jth JPS program who were among the N highest (most likely) ranked 
recipients.  We find almost no association between targeting performance (as we measure 
it) and social characteristics of the villages38.    
Table 12:  Quality of village targeting (fraction of the program participants that were among those in the 
village that would be chosen on economic criteria alone, 0 is worst, 1 is best) and village social activity 
OPK 
Labor 
Creating Health Scholarships Credit Average 
engagement in social 
activities Coeff. 
P 
level Coeff. 
P 
level Coeff. 
P 
level Coeff. 
P 
level. Coeff. 
P 
level
Social Organizations .068 .35 -.182 .09 -.11 .081 -.095 .35 -.069 .473
Social Networks -.008 .83 -.003 .96 .066 .046 .049 .49 .006 .910
Village Government .0039 .95 .202 .04 -.004 .926 -.035 .73 .136 .101
Sociability -.002 .91 -.016 .63 -.001 .959 .016 .64 .011 .729
N 42  26  41  32  37  
R2 .511  .416  .679  .17  .277  
Note:  Also included are binary variables for the district.   
  
 Interpretation.  The implementation of targeting will be influenced by household 
and community characteristics and that influence does not necessarily lead to more “pro-
poor” targeting.  The de jure design can work either to limit these influences or to 
accommodate them by providing explicit local discretion, along with checks on that 
discretion. 
 
                                                 
38 Galasso and Ravallion (2001) find no association of the intra-community targeting performance of FFE 
(Food for Education) funds and village social characteristics (a cooperative society in the village, 
club/recreation in the village) but do find that land inequality, shocks, isolation (no telephone in the village) 
and higher private transfers lead to worse targeting of that public program.    
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 Conclusion  
We will not recapitulate the empirical findings, nor lessons about crisis programs 
more broadly as there are many aspects of program design we have not addressed (e.g. 
institutional and organizational capacity, program impact), program impact on 
beneficiaries we not addressed, and there were even aspects of targeting we have not 
addressed (e.g. the cost of the various targeting mechanisms).  Let us attempt four 
summary statements. 
• Some designed targeting produces much better targeting incidence than no 
targeting, but the de jure design is not as critical. 
• Especially in a crisis the dynamics of household welfare is important and this 
requires dynamics in targeting—either through self-selection (which is very 
expensive in benefits delivered per program expenditure) or through 
administrative flexibility. 
• Neither small nor large is necessarily beautiful. 
• Local conditions will influence implementation—but “communities” may well 
demand less sharp targeting than centralized administrative criteria.   
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Appendix table A.1:  Influence of household characteristics on participation in JPS programs, from three rounds of 
the 100 Villages Survey 
OPK Scholarship Health PK 
 means Percent Sig Percent Sig. Percent Sig.  Sig.
Ln(real per person household exp) 11.200 -0.271 ** -0.173 ** -0.437 ** -0.623 ** 
Change in real expenditures 0.028 -0.110 ** 0.175 ** -0.037  -0.194 ** 
Membership in government/social organizations (from previous round) 
Women’s organization (PKK) 0.276 -0.029 ** -0.004  0.283 ** 0.083 * 
Neighborhood organization (??) 0.223 -0.024 * 0.241 ** 0.168 ** -0.291 ** 
Youth Organization (??) 0.132 0.034 ** -0.135 ** -0.123 ** -0.241 ** 
Burial society  0.518 0.037 ** 0.038  -0.087 ** -0.102 ** 
Sport Organization (??) 0.195 0.041 ** -0.021  -0.035  0.604 ** 
Religious  0.660 0.051 ** 0.205 ** -0.065 ** -0.184 ** 
Rotating help/credit (arisan)  0.331 -0.097 ** -0.105 ** 0.000  -0.247 ** 
Household characteristics 
Age of the HH head 43.868 -0.003 ** 0.006 ** -0.004 ** -0.004 ** 
Number of HH members 5.503 -0.003  0.114 ** -0.006  -0.011  
Female headed household 0.047 0.006  0.437 ** 0.011  -0.424 ** 
Married head of household 0.939 0.027  -0.235 ** -0.069  -0.142 * 
Highest level of Education of household head (none is default) 
Primary 0.571 -0.079 ** 0.011  -0.039  0.139 ** 
Lower secondary 0.092 -0.232 ** -0.026  -0.108 ** 0.213 ** 
Higher secondary 0.098 -0.411 ** -0.220 ** -0.109 * -0.455 ** 
Tertiary  0.025 -0.709 ** -0.347 ** -0.487 ** -0.616 ** 
Sector of “main source of household income” 
Industry 0.059 0.074 ** 0.184 ** -0.059  -0.278 ** 
Trade 0.112 0.017  -0.047  -0.213 ** -0.243 ** 
Service  0.217 0.003  -0.016  -0.114 ** -0.177 ** 
Other  0.012 -0.042  0.368 ** 0.042  -0.558 ** 
Employment status of the individual (unemployed is default) 
Self employed/employer 0.691 0.010  0.260 ** -0.082 * 0.210 ** 
Employee 0.235 -0.041 ** 0.451 ** -0.158 ** 0.400 ** 
Family worker 0.010 -0.038  0.903 ** -0.081  0.460 ** 
Ownership of various assets 
radio*| 0.651 -0.015 * -0.135 ** -0.209 ** 0.180 ** 
tv*| 0.406 -0.150 ** -0.002  -0.217 ** -0.206 ** 
refri*| 0.091 -0.295 ** -0.424 ** -0.469 ** -0.280 ** 
phone*| 0.511 -0.055 ** -0.002  -0.041  -0.136 ** 
Dishant*| 0.070 -0.270 ** -0.290 ** -0.382 ** 0.098  
bike*| 0.381 -0.030 ** -0.040  0.359 ** 0.472 ** 
Mtrbike*| 0.168 -0.058 ** -0.292 ** -0.082 * -0.181 ** 
car*| 0.046 -0.050 ** -0.336 ** 0.050  -0.281 ** 
land*| 0.737 -0.032 ** -0.003  -0.492 ** 0.720 ** 
pred p  0.514  0.0658  0.069  0.0486  
Psuedor2  0.242  0.112  0.103  0.217  
N  133637  88853  133637  133637  
 
